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outweigh a presumption of due validity of probate, which he has not
had an opportunity to meet in the probate court.
LOWELL M. GOERLICH.
LABOR LAW
THE RIGHT TO PICKET IN THE ABSENCE OF A TRADE DISPUTE.
Three recent cases decided in the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County involved the use of the injunction to restrain picket-
ing. In none of these cases was there a strike in process, nor was there
any legitimate trade dispute between the employer and his employees.
In the first case the labor union demanded that the employer raise
the prices charged for the dry cleaning of clothes, and that he stop
advertising low prices. Upon his refusal to comply, the union picketed
his place of business without using force or coercion. The Court en-
joined the picketing, finding that there was no legitimate trade dispute
and that the union's activities violated the Valentine Act. Markowitz v.
The Dry Cleaners Union et al., 19 Abs. 445, 3 Ohio Op. 366 (1935).
The remaining two cases involved a demand by the union for a
dosed shop. Upon the employer's refusal, his apartment houses were
picketed. The employer-employee relationship was entirely amicable.
The defendant unions, however, were engaged in using force in both
cases. The Court granted the injunction in these cases on the ground
of an illegal secondary boycott. Savoy Realty Co. v. McGee, 19 Abs.
682, 4 Ohio Op. 88 (i935) ; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. McGee,
19 Abs. 691, 4 Ohio Op. 99 (i935).
The court in these last two cases intimates that had the picketing
been peaceful, without the use of force and coercion, and in furtherance
of a legitimate trade dispute, there would have been no ground for
injunction. In distinguishing between these cases and a California case,
Lisse et al. v. Local Union No. 31, Cooks, Waiters, & Waitresses, et al.,
2 Cal. (2d) 312 (935), 41 Pac. (2d) 314, in which both elements
were present, the court said each case must be judged upon its own
facts. "However we find no analogy . . . . In the California case we
find that the employees . . . . becoming dissatisfied, called a strike,
which was followed by picketing." The California Court granted the
injunction on the ground of undue force and coercion, but saying in the
course of its decision, "A trade union, besides having the right to call a
strike, has the legal right to carry on a boycott, both primary and
secondary."
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Peaceful picketing has frequently been held lawful in Ohio. The
La France Electrical Construction & Supply Co. v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 8, et al., io8 Ohio St.
61, 14o N.E. 897 (1923); Louis Park et al. v. Locals Nos. io6, zo8,
and 167 of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance
et al., 22 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 257, 30 Ohio Dec. 64 (1920); Fred
Wiley et al. v. Retail Clerks Ass'n Union et al., 32 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
257 (1934); Bellview Brewing Co. v. International Union of the
United Brewery Workers of America et al., 12 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 257,
24 Ohio Dec. 102 (191i).
The right to picket peacefully is dependent upon the existence of a
legitimate trade dispute. This has been defined to mean that there
must be, or must have been, an employer-employee relationship out of
which the dispute grew, concerning some matter relating to the employ-
ment. The La France Electrical Construction & Supply Co. v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 8 et al, supra;
Fred Wiley et al. v. Retail Clerks Ass'n Union et al., supra; Lundoff-
Bicknell Co. v. Smith, 24 Ohio App. 294, i56 N.E. 243 (1927);
The Driggs Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees
Local Union No. 361 et al., 3 Ohio Op. 212, 49 Ohio App. 303
(1935).
However, in two cases injunctions against picketing were refused
where there was no dispute between the employee and his employer, but
only between the employer and the labor organization. The S. .A. Clark
Co. v. The Cleveland Waiters & Beverage Dispensers Local No. xo6
et al., 22 Ohio App. 265, 154 N.E. 362 (1926); McCormick &
Fisher v. Local Union No. 216 Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 13
Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 545, 32 C.D. 165 (1911). These cases were
instances of a boycott, and the courts justified their conclusions upon
the ground that the conduct of the labor organizations was lawful in
so far as it was peaceful. But the courts failed to recognize that a
legitimate trade dispute is as essential to a lawful boycott as it is to a
lawful strike. Brown & Son v. United Mine Workers, 25 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 485 (1925); United Tailors Co. v. Amalgamated Workers,
26 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 439 (1926).
In the Markowitz case, supra, the peaceful picketing was enjoined
on the ground that there was no legitimate trade dispute. On this
authority, it would follow that even had the picketing been peaceful in
the Savoy and Mutual cases, supra, the court would have granted the
injunction.
The Markowitz case, supra, was properly decided upon the further
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ground that the defendants were violating the Valentine Act. This
Act makes it illegal for any persons or associations to combine "to create
or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce," and "to fix at a standard
or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer is in any manner
controlled or established, an article or commodity of merchandise, pro-
duce or commerce, intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption, in
this state." Injunctions have been granted under similar acts where
the labor organization has attempted to enforce unlawful demands by
picketing: Price fixing, Standard Engrauing Co. v. Voltz, 200 App.
Div. 758, 193 N.Y. Supp. 831 (1922); Ellis v. Journeymen Barbers
International Union of America et al., 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N.W. III
(1922); Boycott to force a person to join the organization illegal:
Gildhausez Co. v. Busse, i Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 265 (1916); Picket-
ing, to force a person to close his shop on Saturday night: Hellman v.
.4ssociation, 23 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 177 (1919).
The labor organization in the Markowitz case, supra, violated the
Valentine Act in making an illegal demand upon the Markowitz broth-
ers. This demand, had it been complied with would have had the
effect of creating a price standard, and of eliminating competition, both
of which are prohibited by the Act. C. R. JOHNSON.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP - LIABILITY TO INVITEES
OF TENANT- CONTROL
A woman brought her child to the lessee's photographic studio for
a picture in the nude. The child fell from a chair in the lessee's dressing
room and was severely burned by contact with a steam pipe which had
nothing to identify it as such except its heat. There was evidence to
show that the pipe was excessively hot and that it was used to convey
heat to other parts of the building. The terms of the lease put the lessor
in exclusive control of janitor service, heating, lighting, and repairs and
gave him the right of access to the demised premises at all times. The
plaintiff brought an action against the lessor for damages. The judg-
ment for the plaintiff was sustained in the Court of Appeals on three
grounds only the first of which will be discussed in this note. R.K.O.
Midwest Corp. v. Berling, 51 Ohio App. 85, 199 N.E. 604 (I936).
The bases of decision were: first, the lessor's liability is predicated
on continued control of the premises; second, the lessor and the lessee
